Each of these questions is valid and they point out the necessity of establishing common ground for the discussion to follow. Thus, let us begin this paper with the development of this common ground. First, for this paper, I will use the definition of technology transfer that is given in AFR 80-27' oral or written information or data; hardware; personnel, services, facilities, equipment; or other resources relating to scientific or technological developments of a U.S. Government Research, Development, Test and Engineering (RDT&E) activity, provided or disclosed by any means to another federal agency; a state or local government; an industrial organization, including cooperation, partnership, limited partnership, or industrial development organization; public or private foundation; nonprofit organization, including a university; or other person to enhance or promote technological or industrial innovation for a commercial or public purpose.
Since the subject is limited to the Air Force, the definition of technology transfer will, in most cases, be limited to only the technologies transferred from the Air Force. And since technologies are primarily developed in the Air Force Laboratory system, in this paper the AF Regulation 80-27, Research and Development, Domestic Technology Transfer, Department of the Air Force, Headquarters US Air Force, Washington DC, 31 Jan 1990. definition will be further limited, in general, to the Air Force laboratories as the transferring agency.
Therefore, the definition can be restated as "something of technological value transferred by the Air Force Laboratories to some entity." Since technology transfer can be made by mistake to either potential military enemies or economic competitors, the term domestic technology transfer is used to specify that transfer that ends up in the domestic arena. In this context, domestic arena means American companies as opposed to foreign "transplants" on American soil. Within the U.S. Federal Government, the Department of Defense (DoD), and the
U.S. Air Force (USAF), this type of technology transfer is referred to as Domestic Technology
Transfer or DT2' because the transfer is to a domestic (U.S. owned) entity. In summary then, this paper is really concerned with the transfer of "something of technological value" that is transferred by the Air Force Laboratories to some domestic entity, i.e., USAF domestic technology transfer.
It should also be noted that other terms are sometimes used to describe technology transfer. One of these is technology diffusion and this is really an equivalent term. Because both of these terms, technology transfer and diffusion, are somewhat passive, that is, it says nothing of whether the transfer is useful (i.e., whether the technology is used or employed), another term, "technology deployment", has been suggested 3 . In this paper, the more common term, "domestic technology transfer" will be used with the implication that the technology transferred or diffused Force has remained steadfast over the years in stressing the importance of quality in our systems, or "maintaining the Technology Edge" to counter the quantity of enemy weapon systems.' This strategy was very apparent during the Gulf War of 1991. The weapon systems of the U.S. forces, from surveillance satellites and communications systems, fighter aircraft, and precision guided munitions were technologically superior to those of the countries of the rest of the world. Much was made of the camera coverage of precision air strikes that showed the unbelievable accuracy of precision guided bombs as they almost effortlessly, it seemed, knocked out buildings in the center of Baghdad (with minimum damage collateral damage to surrounding structures), dropped bridge spans, and penetrated reinforced aircraft shelters. Although Iraq had obtained the latest " U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, "The Defense Technology Base: Introduction and Overview --A Special Report," OTA-ISC-374, Washington, DC, U.S. Government Printing Office, March 1988, p. 3.
' Cheney, Dick, Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, January 31, 1992, Witness statement, p.27. Secretary Cheney enumerated several reasons for "continuing our strong emphasis on maintaining our technological edge". versions of various weapons systems from other nations in the world (principally the Soviet Union) and had a roughly equivalent force size, the exchange ratio of casualties and captured was approximately one-thousand to one in favor of the Allies . As a result, the DoD strategy of "technological superiority" was validated convincingly.
Because of this "technological superiority" strategy, the Defense Department -and the Air Force -has stressed the importance of a vigorous, continuing technology development effort with timely technology transfer to the U.S. defense industries. Indeed, Air Power has always been closely linked to science and technology. As an Air Force historian stated:
The very reality of flight depended upon a technical innovation. Unlike the other services, where machines merely support the mission, technology is for the Air Force at the very heart of its existence as an institution. As a consequence, the USAF and its predecessor organizations have always recognized the singular importance of science to their survival. 7 Consequently, a robust DoD research and development (R&D) spending plan was maintained throughout the latter part of the twentieth century that invested up to two-thirds of the nation's Federal R&D funding 8 and nearly one-half of all the U.S.'s R&D funding 9 It is important not only to ensure that we maintain American preeminence in generating new knowledge and know-how in advanced technologies, but also that we encourage the swiftest possible transfer of Federal developed science and technology to the private sector. All of the provisions of (Executive order 12591) are designed to keep the United States on the leading edge of international competition.
Indeed, as Inman observed, it was not "a lack of advanced technology or a failure of research that led to the downfall of certain basic American industries, but the inability to bring " Inman, B.R., and Burton, Daniel F., Jr, "Technology and Competitiveness: The New Policy Frontier," Foreign Affairs, Spring 1990, p. 116. new technology rapidly to the marketplace and to manufacture high-quality products. 4 "" Thus, the metric for measurement of the effectiveness of DoD (and therefore Air Force) technology transfer seems to be changing to include the effectiveness of transfer of technology to domestic commercial industries as well as to defense industries. Prior to 1980, the measure of effectiveness would have been how well the Air Force Labs transferred technology to the U.S.
defense industries for incorporation into weapon systems.
The next section of this paper will discuss how the Air Force laboratories approached this task and some of the successes. Next, we will examine the laws enacted by Congress to facilitate the transfer of technology from the USAF Labs to the commercial sector, the response of the Air Force Labs to these laws, and the problems and opportunities this new challenge presents.
Finally, we will examine the future course of Air Force Domestic Technology Transfer.
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER TO DEFENSE INDUSTRIES
As we have seen, the primary goal of the Air Force labs prior to at least 1980 was the transfer of technology to defense industries to "maintain the technology edge" of the U.S.'s warfighting systems. Any advantages to the commercial sector were really thought of "spin-offs" and were welcome as a useful by-product that partially justified the large defense expenditures and enhanced the industrial base. 5 " Ibid., p. 120. How does the Air Force manage its laboratories to obtain an efficient development of technologies and a flow of these technologies into industry? To understand that we must first briefly look at the way the DoD allocates funding. Funding for technology development is provided in three categories as shown below:`6
(1) Basic Researchbudget category 6.1.
The development of new ideas that are principally paper products backed up by experiments and theoretical calculations.
(2) Exploratory Development --budget category 6.2.
Laboratory bench-top feasibility determinations are conducted on military technologies derived from the principles discovered in basic research.
(3) Advanced Technology Developmentbudget category 6.3 ATD.
The testing of hardware in a "'near" military environment to reduce risk of full scale development of the technology and to expedite domestic technology transition.
The sum of these three categories is the Science and Technology (S&T) program. It is important to note that S&T does not include Advanced Development Programs, budget category 6.3B. Advanced Development is system specific and is the first step in the acquisition process.
Thus, in basic research a fundamental idea or process is conceived and explored. As it matures, it moves into the exploratory development category for further definition and development. Then, if the exploratory development process is successful, a part (of course it might also be a process, skill, or technique) is constructed and tested as part of a generic system. If successful, the item is then ready for full-scale development.
An example of this flow is the "single crystal" turbine blade. Researchers discovered that a metal crystal could be "grown" in various shapes if certain temperature and pressure conditions were achieved. This idea was then pursued by jet turbine experts in exploratory development to see if turbine blade materials could be "grown" in the shape of turbine blades since the single crystal blade offered strength characteristics that were superior to standard blades. After .chieving success in "growing" the single crystal blade, the new blade was inserted into a test engine to determine if the presupposed superior material characteristics of a turbine blade were obtained. Finally, with success of the single crystal blade in the test engine, the new blade technology was ready for incorporation into existing engines to enhance their performance. Since the design characteristics of operational engines (e.g., maximum turbine inlet temperature) usually don't change after their introduction, this new technology provides a blade that has superior strength characteristics and therefore provides extended engine life for existing engines. In addition, since these single-crystal blades maintain their strength at higher temperatures than ordinary blades, they also became important elements of newly designed higher performance engines. Higher temperature operation means that the engine generates a greater engine thrustto-weight ratio, i.e., the new, lighte engine generates as much thrust as the current engine.
"The manner in which this process is pursued gives one insight into the Air Force philosophy of effecting technology transfer. First, the bulk of the funding for basic research (sometimes just referred to as research) goes to U.S. universities. This leverages the excellent U.S. research base and provides the continuing funding to keep it strong. Over the long run this strong research base ensures a steady flow on new ideas in the exploratory development arena.
In exploratory development (6.2), the work is split between the Air Force labs and industry. The idea here is to begin the involvement of industry in the technology development at the earliest stage and balance that with the necessity of keeping the laboratory scientists and engineers involved and current in the actual research.
Finally, in advanced technology development, most of the work is performed on contract by industry as opposed to government laboratory workers ensuring that the technology application is transferred from the laboratory to industry. Then as new weapon systems are needed, the latest technology has already been transferred to the defense industry and is ready for application.' 7
To provide a balance between the development of the technology (research and exploratory development) and the proof of the technology and transition (advanced technology development), Air Force funding is balanced between these efforts during most years.18
As noted earlier, in recent years DoD has spent roughly $9 billion per year on its science and technology programs (research, exploratory development, and advanced technology turbine engine development. For example, the engine core technology was developed in the GEl demonstrator that was the basis for the GE 1/6 engine. This was the first high bypass turbofan.
This development led directly to the TF39 engine for the C-5 aircraft. The commercial derivatives of the TF-39 were the CF6 for the Boeing 747, the Douglas DC-10, and the LM2500 series for marine and industrial turbines. The high thrust CF6 engine derivative led to the CF-6 engine for the Boeing 767 and Air Force 1L"2 Notice also that the technology is applicable to ground-based turbines for power generation and to small turbines like those used in helicopters.
Similarly, the development of composite materials began in the Air Force labs in the These two examples demonstrate that the technology transition by the Air Force to defense industries such as Boeing and General Electric have been very effective and in fact have caused these companies to lead the world in the sales of advanced commercial aircraft and gas turbine engines." 6 Indeed, many other examples could be given. In summary, the fact that the U.S. Air
Force is the most technologically advanced in the world seems clear evidence that technology transition to defense industries is effective. Table I provides a listing of the pertinent legislative acts in this area through 1991.
Each of the legislative initiatives are then summarized in the paragraphs following Table 1. 
The Bayh-Dole University and Small Business Patent Procedure Act of 1980
-Allows small firms and universities to get and retain the title to inventions funded by the federal government.
Small Business Innovation Development Act of 1982
-Required agencies to provide special funds for small business R&D connected to the agencies' missions.
The National Cooperative Research Act of 1984
-Permits consortia of companies, with proper registration with the Department of Commerce, to enter into joint ventures without violating antitrust laws (i.e., precompetitive R&D). The low does not allow co-production.
-Resulted in Consortia: Semiconductor Research Corporation (SEMATECH) and Microelectronics and Computer Technology Corporation (MCC), among others.
Trademark Clarification Act of 1984
-Permitted decisions to be made at the laboratory level in government-owned, contractor-operated (GOCO) laboratories as to the awarding licenses for patents.
6.
Japanese Technical Literature Act of 1986 -Improved the availability of Japanese science and engineering literature in the U.S.
The Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986
-Made technology transfer a responsibility of all Federal laboratory scientists and engineers.
-Mandated that technology transfer responsibility be considered in employee performance evaluations.
-Grants government laboratory directors authority to enter into cooperative research and development agreements (CRDAs) with for-profit corporations, to assign patent rights to firms participating in cooperative agreements and to license technolog ;s.
-Provides for the retention of licensing royalties by government labs.
-Mandates that a minimum 15 percent of royalties on Federal patents be awarded to Federal inventors. 
National Institute of Standards and Technology Authorization Act for FY 1989
-Reconstituted The National Technical Information Services as the National Technical Information corporation.
-Established a Technology Administration within the Department of Commerce.
-Permitted contractual consideration for rights to intellectual property other than patents in cooperative research and development agreements.
-Included software development contributors eligible for awards.
Water Resources Development Act of 1988
-Authorized Army Corps of Engineers laboratories and research centers to enter into cooperative research and development agreements.
National Competitiveness Technology Transfer Act of 1989
-Grants contractor-operated Federal laboratories the authority to enter in CRDAs and license technologies to the commercial sector. 
Prior to 1980
As mentioned earlier, prior to 1980, the major emphasis for technology transfer was from the Air Force Laboratories to the defense industry. There are numerous examples of successes of USAF technology transfer during this period and two major success stories were given earlier.
Could the technology transfer been more efficient? Almost certainly. But the transfer was successful, and the fact that the U.S. Air Force was more capable (technologically superior) to all other Air Forces in the world is really the best argument for effectiveness.
to 1991
During this period, technology transition to the defense industry continued to be effective.
The military laboratories continued their technological leadership and the flow of technologies from the laboratory to the defense industry continued to provide superior weapon systems.
Interestingly, the laboratories also began to take advantage of "spin-in", i.e., using commercially Agreements (CRDA). Based on these points, the effort must be rated as effective. However, some measure of effectiveness needs to be established in the future to allow managers to gage "28 their efforts. Should that be the number of CRDAs? The royalty value of the CRDAs? Or some other measure? This measure should be carefully thought out as it will tend to drive the entire program in the future. Without some clearly stated objective, the goal will probably become the total number of CRDAs without any regard to the usefulness of the individual CRDA. Ultimately this could become an obstacle to quality CRDAs and reduce the effectiveness of the desired domestic technology transfer.
FUTURE USAF DOMESTIC TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
The Air Force Laboratories are now faced with two goals in technology transfer. The first goal is the historic one, to ensure that the U.S. Air Force is the superior air force in the .world by keeping its technology superior. This requires development and transference of technology to the defense industries. The second goal is the one mandated by Congress beginning in 1980 to transfer technologies to the private sector to enhance the U.S.'s competitiveness.
The difficulty is that these goals are conflicting. Military superiority, the first goal, allows the researcher to focus on developing technologies that enhance the mission capability of the operator or "war fighter." Any advantages that the commercial sector receives are merely "spinoffs" and are not the primary goal of the technology transfer process. In fact, a collateral objective is to limit the transfer of technology outside the defense industries to prevent this technology from falling into the hands of the enemies of the U.S. Military technologies that have a commercial value or "dual-use" technologies have always been a dual-edged sword. The Defense Department has always been concerned with technologies that offered military advantage that also had a commercial value. If these technologies are released to the commercial sector where they are freely available to anyone, they can easily flow to the military establishment of a potential enemy.
On the other hand, domestic technology transfer's goal is to maximize the transfer of technology to domestic entities. In an environment of economic competition, this becomes an important element of national security. But should the Department of Defense be directed to carry out an essentially commercial program that conflicts with the basic goal of military research? Indeed, the government laboratory researcher, when faced with a choice, may be persuaded to pursue "commercially useful" technologies in lieu of "militarily useful" technologies simply because development of the commercially useful technology may be financially rewarding personally, i.e., royalties.
It appears that one solution to this dilemma would be to create a civilian agency that has the mission of developing technologies that are necessary for the U.S.'s economic security. This agency would be a part of a cabinet level department (Department of Commerce?) and would direct laboratories that develop commercial technologies for economic strength just as the DoD laboratories were created to develop technologies that are necessary for the U.S.'s national defense. The national laboratories would be a part of this new agency. The military laboratories could continue to transfer technology when appropriate and would be coordinated with this new government agency and its "commerce laboratories." However, the major emphasis for the development and transition of technologies to the commercial sector would be the responsibility of this new agency.
In summary, the Air Force has been effective in developing and transferring technologies to weapon systems through defense industries throughout its history. Since 1980 and the onset 30 of various laws conceived to speed the transfer of technologies to the commercial sector, the Air Force has also been effective in responding to these new laws and building an infrastructure to effect the desired transfer. ORTAs have been established and are working to build relationships that will enhance technology transfer to the U.S.'s commercial entities.
Leaders in Congress and the Executive branch of government must take care, however, to ensure that the fundamental mission of the Air Force laboratories not be distorted because of panic about the nation's competitive economic position.
The fundamental mission of the Air Force laboratories must always be the development of technologies needed to ensure a superior United States Air Force!
